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INTRODUCTION 
alief Browder was returning home from a party in the Bronx, ten 
days before his seventeenth birthday, when he and his friends 
were stopped by police responding to a call of robbery.1 Though a 
search of their pockets yielded nothing, police arrested Kalief and his 
friends.2 Kalief was charged with robbery, grand larceny, and assault; 
his bail was set at three thousand dollars.3 Unable to meet bail, Kalief 
was sent on a bus to Rikers Island, a four-hundred-acre jail complex 
that houses eleven thousand inmates on any given day.4 The 
conditions at Rikers are “notoriously grim,” and it has a “deep-seated 
culture of violence” including reports of broken bones, fractures, and 
lacerations in all forms.5 Upon arrival, Kalief was instantly met with 
the threat of violence by other inmates and prison guards alike, which 
persisted while he awaited trial.6 Although fellow inmates and the 
prosecution urged him to take a plea deal, Kalief refused, despite the 
potential fifteen-year sentence.7 Only 165 felony cases proceeded to 
trial in the Bronx in 2011, in stark contrast to the 3391 cases in which 
the defendants pled guilty,8  exemplifying just how rare Kalief’s story 
is. Kalief’s time at Rikers Island was brutal and taxing on him. While 
in Rikers, Kalief was held in solitary confinement, was prohibited 
 
1 Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www 
.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
K 
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from speaking to his mother, was given an inadequate amount of food 
for a person his age, suffered beatings by corrections officers, and 
even tried to hang himself while awaiting trial.9 Kalief spent more 
than a thousand days in Rikers before his case was dismissed due to 
the prosecutor’s inability to meet the burden of proof.10 
Although Kalief was eventually released, he never fully recovered 
from his time at Rikers Island.11 Kalief would recreate the conditions 
of solitary confinement in his own bedroom in the Bronx, now 
uncomfortable being around people.12 Two years after his release, 
Kalief committed suicide at his parents’ house.13 
This type of situation, in which those presumed innocent are 
nonetheless subjected to pretrial detention due to an inability to post 
bail, is a systemic problem in our state judicial and corrections 
systems. Although the United States federal system has taken steps to 
improve its pretrial detention program by largely eliminating surety 
bonds, many states have failed to do so. Under surety bond and cash 
bail systems, the accused must provide a certain amount of cash to 
assure the defendant will return to court for his or her trial. With so 
few merits to the surety bond, compared to other means of 
guaranteeing pretrial compliance, how can this be? What system best 
balances the interest of guaranteeing a detainee’s appearance at trial 
and his or her humanitarian rights? Is pretrial preventive detention 
ever morally acceptable? If so, under what circumstances? If not, why 
not? 
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of pretrial detention 
and its relationship to the presumption of innocence and wrongful 
convictions. Part II discusses international and domestic law 
governing pretrial detention and compares the federal and state 
systems of pretrial detention in the United States. The Part begins by 
discussing how the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) created standards by which countries across the globe 
are required to handle those arrested and awaiting trial. Citing 
language in the ICCPR, Part II discusses the federal system in the 
 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Michael Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, Kalief Browder, Held at Rikers Island for 3 
Years Without Trial, Commits Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2015/06/09/nyregion/kalief-browder-held-at-rikers-island-for-3-years-without-trial   
-commits-suicide.html?_r=0. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
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United States for pretrial detainees through the Bail Reform Act of 
1984 and the Act’s effect on pretrial detention. 
Part III then turns to current state pretrial programs, highlighting 
their continued reliance primarily on surety cash-bail bonds. Part III 
attempts to answer why the states are not implementing reforms 
similar to those adopted in the Bail Reform Act. In doing so, the Part 
examines who benefits and who suffers under surety bonds and 
examines how the political climate can facilitate a system that 
primarily uses conditions other than cash bail to secure appearance. 
The Comment concludes with Part IV, which evaluates possible 
solutions to the epidemic of pretrial detention triggered solely by a 
detainee’s inability to post cash bail and suggests reforms that both 
our state and federal governments might enact to improve our current 
system of pretrial detention in the United States. 
I 
BACKGROUND OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 
The number of pretrial detainees is staggering not only in the 
United States’ federal and state systems, but also worldwide. This 
Part discusses who these pretrial detainees are and how the United 
States addresses pretrial detainees. 
A. Number of Offenders in Pretrial Detention Internationally 
Globally, the number of suspects detained in pretrial detention is 
remarkably high, especially considering the guidelines set forth in the 
ICCPR, which dictates a preference for alternatives to pretrial 
detention. At any given moment, 3.3 million people are being held in 
pretrial detention worldwide.14 Those 3.3 million people will spend a 
collective 660 million days in pretrial detention.15 In 2012, one third 
of the world’s ten million incarcerated persons were in pretrial 
detention.16 Asia holds the highest proportion of pretrial detainees at 
40.6% of their prison population, followed by Africa at 34.7%, the 
Americas at 27.9%, and Europe at 18.8%.17 Developing countries 
have the highest number of pretrial detainees.18 
 
14 OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: THE GLOBAL OVERUSE 
OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 11 (2014), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites 
/default/files/presumption-guilt-09032014.pdf. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 16. 
17 Id. at 17. 
18 Id. at 18. 
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Across the globe, 10.3 million prisoners occupy 8.7 million allotted 
spaces.19 Overcrowding in jails and prisons is often worse in 
developing countries due to rapid population growth and lack of 
resources for prison construction.20 The poor are disproportionately 
subjected to this overcrowding.21 Blame can be placed in part on 
money bail, which requires a monetary deposit that often the poor 
cannot conjure in time to be released before their trial.22 In one 
example, a woman accused of drug possession was held in pretrial 
detention with her baby for a year because she was unable to pay the 
15,000 rupees (U.S. $134) to secure her release.23 
Overcrowding creates humanitarian problems for the pretrial 
detainees, who are typically subjected to harsher conditions in 
overpopulated local jails than convicted offenders held in long-term 
prison facilities.24 These harsh conditions can include a lack of 
separation between violent and nonviolent pretrial detainees, and in 
other cases, a lack of separation between convicted prisoners and 
pretrial detainees.25 The conditions stemming from overcrowding can 
infringe on an individual’s human rights by denying resources such as 
adequate beds, food, and medicine.26 Unfortunately, governments 
often seek to excuse these harsh conditions for pretrial detainees by 
pointing to the difficulty of predicting the number of pretrial detainees 
and the length of their stay.27 
B. How Pretrial Detention Contributes to Wrongful Conviction 
Of the numerous factors to blame for wrongful convictions,28 the 
pretrial criminal process is a significant one.29 Pretrial detention 
 
19 Id. at 30. 
20 Id. at 31. 
21 Id. at 33. 
22 Id. at 35. 
23 Id. at 36. 
24 Id. at 57. 
25 Id. at 60. 
26 Id. at 59. 
27 Id. at 60. 
28 Examples include faulty eyewitnesses, witness perjury, ineffective counsel, forensic 
errors, failure to properly investigate a case, relying on questionable evidence, juries 
putting too much faith in scientific evidence, and overestimating witnesses’ ability to 
perceive and remember. See generally H. Patrick Furman, Wrongful Convictions and the 
Accuracy of the Criminal Justice System, 32 COLO. LAW. 11 (2003). 
29 Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 
42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1124 (2005). 
ROHRER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/24/2017  6:14 PM 
522 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95, 517 
hampers the ability of defendants and their lawyers to consult about 
strategy and coordinate investigation.30 During Kalief’s detention, his 
attorney could seldom take the ferry from Brooklyn to Rikers 
Island.31 A defendant’s inability to assist with his defense, identify 
alibis, and help his attorney secure hard-to-find-evidence, can 
contribute to wrongful convictions.32 Furthermore, Kalief’s resistance 
to plead guilty under the pressure of pretrial detention is an anomaly; 
many defendants plead no contest for reasons unrelated to the strength 
of the prosecution’s evidence.33 The precise relationship between 
pretrial detention prevalence and rates of wrongful convictions is 
difficult to quantify given the myriad factors that play into wrongful 
convictions.34 Although not completely conclusive, studies have 
shown that defendants detained pending trial are generally more 
likely to be convicted than their counterparts on pretrial release.35 
C. Is the Presumption of Innocence Still Alive in the Federal System? 
The goal of pretrial detention is twofold: to assure the accused 
appears in court and for public safety. The role of the judge in this 
matter, practically speaking, is to predict whether the accused will 
make his court appearance without being detained before his trial or 
will commit a crime during his trial. This duty of the judge, however, 
seems to strike against a core goal of justice here in the United States, 
which is the accused are presumed innocent until proven guilty.36 
Despite this presumption, the percentage of federal defendants 
detained pretrial increased from fifty-nine percent to seventy-six 
percent between 1995 and 2010.37 This growth in pretrial detention 
has been attributed mainly to pretrial detention of immigration 
defendants, who saw an increase in their rates of pretrial detention 
 
30 Id. at 1130. 
31 Gonnerman, supra note 1, at 10. 
32 Leipold, supra note 29, at 1130. 
33 Id. at 1154−56. 
34 Id. at 1131. 
35 Id. at 1131 n.27; see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN 
LARGE URBAN COUNTIES 24 (2000) (“Seventy-seven percent of the defendants who were 
detained until case disposition were actually convicted of some offense, compared to 55% 
of those released pending disposition.”). 
36 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). 
37 THOMAS H. COHEN, PRETRIAL DETENTION AND MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURTS, 1995–2010 1 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdmfdc95 
10.pdf. 
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from eighty-six percent in 1995 to ninety-eight percent in 2008.38 
However, defendants charged with drug and weapons offenses also 
saw significant increases in pretrial detention rates.39 
Overall, the rates of pretrial detention correlate with the severity of 
defendants’ criminal arrest histories.40 Specifically, in 2010, sixty-
four percent of defendants with no prior arrests were detained 
pretrial.41 The rate of pretrial detention increased to seventy-nine 
percent when defendants had two to four prior arrests and to eighty-
five percent when defendants had five or more arrests.42 Obviously, 
the defendant’s arrest record is a significant factor in whether or not 
he will be released before trial, and rightly so. Recidivism is 
predictive of future actions, including future crimes, be it another 
crime in the community or the failure to appear in court. The court 
usually leans in favor of detaining those accused with serious prior 
criminal histories, rather than allowing them back into the public to 
await trial either via recognizance or under supervision. If a defendant 
was released back into the public and, while on release, committed 
another serious crime, there would likely be public outcry against the 
judge who issued the release order. However, as the numbers above 
show, this policy of presumptive detention may be too broad. 
Despite these statistics, or perhaps because of them, the percentage 
of released defendants who fail to make court appearances between 
1995 through 2010 ranged from a mere one percent to three percent, 
suggesting that the current system of pretrial detention is likely 
overinclusive.43 The problem is one of false negatives. Of course, a 
defendant’s failure to appear or committal of another crime while out 
on pretrial release generates immediate feedback that that he or she 
should have been detained. Conversely, however, there is no way to 
detect if an individual detained pending trial would have made court 
appearances had he been released. How can a judge accurately predict 
whether a defendant will appear for his next court appearance? 
Though the federal system may not have mechanisms in place to 
detect overdetention, it largely eschews cash bail so defendants’ 
freedom is rarely determined by their socioeconomic status. 
 
38 Id. at 3. 
39 Id. at 4. 
40 Id. at 6. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 8. 
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D. Development of Federal Pretrial Services in the United States 
In 1961, the Manhattan Bail Project established the first pretrial 
services program in the country, emphasizing the use of pretrial 
release on conditions independent of financial surety bonds.44 The 
Manhattan Bail Project served as the impetus for the federal bail 
reform movement, which pressured legislators around the country to 
rewrite statutes to reflect a preference for releasing arrestees on their 
own recognizance or on non-financial conditions of release before 
trial.45 Still, reform has not been uniform.46 Varying jurisdictional 
goals have led to divergent release criteria, including recognizance, 
supervision, and financial conditions.47 While some jurisdictions 
aimed to reduce jail populations, others wanted to provide supervision 
to arrestees pending trial.48 Some jurisdictions targeted certain groups 
of defendants for release on supervision, while still others interviewed 
all arrestees.49 
To combat these inconsistencies, the Department of Justice created 
two programs: the National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies 
and the Pretrial Service Resource Center, to develop national 
professional standards for pretrial programs and to compare these 
programs nationwide.50 Those programs are still in place today and 
currently survey issues involving the administrative locus, program 
scope and size, program funding and staffing, and specific program 
practices.51 These programs are more thoroughly discussed in Part II, 
but here, it is important to emphasize the federal system’s long history 
of bail reform and its movement away from cash-bail. 
 
44 JOHN CLARK & D. ALAN HENRY, PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMMING AT THE 
START OF THE 21ST CENTURY: A SURVEY OF PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS 1 (2003), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/199773.pdf. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. For further information on the National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies, 
see their website at http://napsa.org/eweb/startpage.aspx, and for more information on the 
Pretrial Service Resource Center, visit their website at http://www.pretrial.org. 
51 Id. 
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E. The States’ Overuse of Surety Bonds in Contrast to the Federal 
System 
 
Figure 1: Rise in Surety Bonds in State Courts52 
Unlike the federal system, state courts employ the use of the cash-
bail systems as their primary regulation of pretrial release and 
detention. Between 1990 to 1998, the release of defendants based on 
financial conditions rose from twenty-four percent to thirty-six 
percent, while releases secured by other means dropped from forty 
percent to twenty-eight percent, as seen in Figure 1.53 The percentage 
of defendants required to post bond to secure release rose from fifty-
three percent in 1990 to sixty-eight in 2004, of which less than half 
were actually able to post this financial bail.54 This is the crux of the 
problem: Why are states relying on a defendant’s ability to post bail 
as an indicator for whether he will show up for his court appearance 
or abide by the law while out on release? Why do states insist on the 
use of financial release instead of other forms of pretrial release? Why 
have state courts not enacted any type of reforms, as the federal 
system has? Answering these questions requires a step back to 
examine how these laws are formed. 
 
52 THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, STATE COURT PROCESSING STATISTICS, 
1990–2004: PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 2 (2007), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 3. 
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II 
BACKGROUND LAW 
A. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
establishes international guidelines regarding pretrial detainees.55 Its 
section on the treatment of pretrial detainees reads: 
Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought 
promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to 
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a 
reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that 
persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may 
be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the 
judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of 
the judgment.56 
To apply these guidelines, the United Nations created a handbook 
providing more specific instructions.57 The handbook interprets the 
ICCPR as dictating that pretrial detention should only be used to 
ensure a suspect’s appearance at trial, prevent the interference with 
evidence, and prevent further offences.58 While the federal system 
has, at least to some extent, adopted these goals, state systems 
generally have not. 
Cash bail and surety bonds bear a weak relationship to these goals 
and unfairly benefit the wealthy and penalize the poor. A wealthy 
person may not be deterred from nonappearance or future crimes by 
even a relatively high fixed bail amount, while a poor person who 
poses little to no risk of nonappearance or future crimes may end up 
detained unnecessarily by even a relatively low cash-bail amount. 
The handbook also provides that judges, when deciding whether 
pretrial detention is necessary, should always impose the least 
confining measures compatible with the interests of justice and 
society.59 Specifically, custody pending trial should be ordered only if 
“there is reasonable suspicion that the accused has committed the 
alleged offence and that he is likely to abscond, interfere with the 
 
55 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N. 
14668. 
56 Id. 
57 U.N. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
BRANCH, PROFESSIONAL TRAINING SERIES NO. 3: HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRETRIAL 
DETENTION, U.N. Sales No. E.94.XIV.6 (1994). 
58 Id. at 8. 
59 Id. at 13. 
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course of justice, or commit a serious offence.”60 If one is ordered 
detained pending trial, the maximum period of pretrial detention 
should be proportionate to the maximum potential sentence.61 If an 
offender is released before trial, the court should impose the 
minimum controls necessary to ensure the offender’s return to trial 
and the safety of witnesses and the community.62 When evaluating 
whether someone will return on his own accord to trial, the handbook 
suggests courts look to family ties, employment status, and criminal 
history as risk factors.63 American courts have perhaps relied on this 
last factor too heavily, as indicated in Part I.64 When comparing the 
standards proposed by the United Nations to what is currently 
happening in the United States, it becomes apparent that the courts 
have not come close to meeting these international guidelines, 
drawing criticism from humanitarian organizations and academic 
commentators,65 including this author. 
B. 1984 Bail Reform Act 
The United States has not adopted the principles set forth in the 
United Nations handbook. With many Americans holding a “hard on 
crime” attitude, legislatures are likely unwilling to draft laws that 
allow more of those arrested back into the public. The Supreme Court 
has held that ICCPR is not judicially enforceable in the United States, 
stating, “although the Covenant does bind the United States as a 
matter of international law, the United States ratified the Covenant on 
the express understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not 
itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts.”66 
 
60 Id. at 1. 
61 Id. at 18. 
62 Id. at 15. 
63 Id. 
64 Gonnerman, supra note 1. 
65 See, e.g., Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1 
(2017) (stating the financial costs of pretrial detention alone call for reform to pretrial 
detention); Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes II: A Proposal for a More 
Serious Look at “The Weight of the Evidence,” 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 84 (2013) 
(stating that courts typically do not allow pretrial release even when the weight of the 
evidence is weak); Danushka S. Medawatte, Justice in Dire Straits: Unlawful Pretrial 
Detainees, Family Members and Legal Remedies, 22 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189 (2016) 
(exploring how overuse of pretrial harms the families of those detained); Tiffany Woelfel, 
Go Directly to Jail, Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Collect $200: Improving Wisconsin’s 
Pretrial Statute, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 207 (2016) (proposing Wisconsin implement pretrial 
risk assessments into state statute). 
66 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004). 
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Instead, the United States has developed its own constitutional 
standards for regulating pretrial detention. These limitations are based 
on the Eighth Amendment’s requirement that “[e]xcessive bail shall 
not be required,”67 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,68 which require that 
laws imposing pretrial detention be narrowly tailored to serve a 
“sufficiently compelling governmental interest.”69 In federal criminal 
proceedings, release and detention decisions are governed by the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984.70 
Under the 1984 Act, a judicial officer has three options to choose 
from during a detention hearing. The first default position is that a 
person’s release on his personal recognizance or unsecured 
appearance bond is appropriate unless such release will not 
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will 
endanger the safety of any person or the community.71 
The second option is release of a person on “the least restrictive 
further condition, or combination of conditions . . . that will 
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the 
safety of any other person and the community.”72 Possible release 
conditions include: remaining in the custody or supervision of a 
designated person; maintaining or seeking employment or education; 
house arrest; restriction from contact with victim or witnesses; 
reporting to a pretrial services or designated law enforcement agency 
for supervision; curfews; refraining from possessing or using drugs, 
alcohol, and firearms; and undergoing medical or psychiatric 
treatment.73 
The third option is pretrial detention, which is appropriate only if 
“no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the 
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other 
person and the community.”74 The Act lists crimes that carry a 
rebuttable presumption of danger to the community, triggering 
pretrial detention, including serious drug trafficking cases, firearm 
cases involving crimes of violence or drug offenses, international 
 
67 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
68 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
69 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987). 
70 Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3156 (2015). 
71 Id. § 3142. 
72 Id. § 3142(c)(1)(B). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. § 3142(e)(1). 
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murder and kidnapping conspiracies, serious acts of terrorism, human 
trafficking, and crimes of violence and sex offenses involving 
minors.75 The government may seek pretrial detention for any 
defendant where it can prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that a 
serious risk exists “that such person will obstruct or attempt to 
obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to 
threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror.”76 The 
government may also seek pretrial detention for any defendant it can 
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, poses a substantial risk of 
flight or risk of obstruction of justice.77 
In determining whether to grant the Government’s request for 
pretrial detention of a defendant, the court considers a list of factors: 
the nature and circumstances of the offense, the weight of the 
evidence against the person, the nature and seriousness of the danger 
to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s 
release, and the “history and characteristics of the person.”78 Under 
the statute, the relevant history and characteristics of the accused 
include: 
[A] person’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties, 
employment, financial resources, length of residence in the 
community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug 
or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning 
appearance at court proceedings; and whether, at the time of the 
current offense or arrest, the person was on probation, on parole, or 
on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of 
sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law.79 
This list is far more extensive than the three factors listed in the 
United Nations handbook. 
Significant for the purposes of this Comment, the Act outlaws the 
use of “a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the 
person.”80 This provision prevents a federal judge from setting an 
impossible financial condition for a defendant, which would have the 
effect of triggering de facto pretrial detention based solely on the 
defendant’s insufficient financial resources. Instead, the Act focuses 
on the characteristics of individual defendants to determine whether 
 
75 Id. § 3142(e)(2). 
76 Id. § 3142(f)(2)(B). 
77 Id. § 3142(f)(2)(A); United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1986). 
78 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2015). 
79 Id. § 3142(g)(3)(A). 
80 Id. § 3142(c)(2). 
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pretrial release or detention is appropriate for the defendant and what 
conditions to impose on any release that is granted. However, it is this 
author’s view that both federal and state judges grant pretrial release 
too infrequently. 
C. Current Pretrial Release Programs 
As mentioned in Part I, the current iterations of many pretrial 
service programs were instituted in the 1960s.81 The American Bar 
Association (ABA) recommends the creation and use of pretrial 
agencies.82 
Pretrial service agencies perform two primary functions: pre-
release investigation and recommendation and post-release 
supervision. When an accused is arrested, formal adjudicatory 
procedures are held and the prosecution seeks a pretrial status other 
than the issuance of a summons for appearance.83 At that point, a 
pretrial services agency begins an investigation to provide the judicial 
officer in charge of making the pretrial detention/release decision 
with information to determine whether releasing the defendant is 
safe.84 The information is gathered via a voluntary interview with the 
defendant, typically in the presence of defense counsel, and a check 
of criminal history and court records.85 The use of objective criteria in 
risk assessment is strongly urged by both the ABA and the National 
Association of Pretrial Services Agencies (NAPSA).86 NAPSA 
explains that objective criteria should be used in order to “remove the 
individual bias [of the pretrial interviewer] [and] . . . remove 
arbitrariness and approach equal treatment for all defendants.”87 
These objective criteria typically include the factors listed in the Bail 
Reform Act: the defendant’s residence and employment status, length 
of time in the area, and ties to the community; criminal record; record 
of appearance in court; current probation, parole, or pretrial status; 
mental health status; and the presence of substance abuse or 
addiction.88 However, objective criteria are not widely used, with 
only one in four pretrial programs exclusively using objective 
 
81 CLARK & HENRY, supra note 44, at 1. 
82 Id. at 13. 
83 Id. at 14. 
84 Id. at 13. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 15. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 13. 
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criteria.89 In fact, thirty-five percent of pretrial service programs 
exclusively use subjective criteria.90 Subjective criteria include court 
demeanor and attitude, and comments from arresting police officers.91 
After an interview, the pretrial services agency verifies the 
information provided by the defendant.92 From this verified 
information, the pretrial services agency conducts a risk assessment 
based on objective criteria to determine flight risk, potential danger to 
the community posed by the defendant’s release, and on what 
conditions, if any, the defendant can be safely released.93 Once the 
investigation and risk assessment have been completed, the pretrial 
services agency presents the information and a recommendation to the 
judicial officer presiding over the defendant’s detention hearing and 
typically provides a copy of the material to both the prosecution and 
defense.94 
If the judge orders the defendant released pending trial, the pretrial 
services agency has the responsibility to supervise the defendant 
during the release period.95 This supervision could include having the 
defendant report to pretrial services by telephone, referrals to 
substance abuse and mental-health treatment, drug and alcohol 
testing, employment and residence reporting and verification, and 
electronic monitoring.96 Pretrial service agencies are responsible for 
verifying the compliance of supervised defendants with release 
conditions and reporting noncompliance to the court.97 Even if a 
defendant is detained pretrial, pretrial service programs are tasked 
with monitoring the detained defendants for changes in circumstances 
that could make them eligible for release in the future.98 
  
 
89 Id. at 15. 
90 Id. 
91 JENNIFER HEDLUND ET. AL., VALIDATION OF CONNECTICUT’S RISK ASSESSMENT 
FOR PRETRIAL DECISION MAKING 3 (2003). 
92 Id. at 14. 
93 Id. at 15. 
94 Id. at 15–16. 
95 Id. at 16–17. 
96 Id. at 17. The last condition, electronic monitoring, will be discussed in more detail 
in Part IV. 
97 CLARK & HENRY, supra note 44, at 1. 
98 HEDLUND ET AL., supra note 91, at 18. 
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D. America’s State Systems 
1. New Jersey: A Prime Example of the Abuse of the Cash-Bail 
System 
New Jersey is in dire need of pretrial detention reform. Just over 
seventy-three percent of its jail population comprises pretrial 
detainees.99 Of these pretrial detainees, 38.5% had an option to post 
bail, but were held based solely on the inability to raise the money.100 
Twelve percent of the jail population in New Jersey is held in custody 
solely due to the inability to pay $2500 or less to secure pretrial 
release.101 These figures do not accord with the humanitarian 
guidelines set forth in ICCPR or the bail reform principles that gave 
rise to the Bail Reform Act of 1984. 
2. A Closer Look: Oregon’s Pretrial Release System 
Oregon law provides four options for defendants pending trial: 
release on personal recognizance, conditional release, security release 
(otherwise known as cash bail), and preventative detention.102 The 
first, second, and fourth options largely mirror the federal pretrial 
detention options. It is the third option that diverges: If a defendant 
does not qualify for release on personal recognizance or conditional 
release, the Oregon bail statute requires that the judicial officer set a 
security amount that will “reasonably assure the defendant’s 
appearance,”103 and allows for the release of the defendant upon the 
deposit of a bond equal to ten percent of that amount.104 The fourth 
option, pretrial detention without the possibility of secured release, 
occurs in two circumstances: (1) when a defendant is charged with 
murder, aggravated murder, or treason and the weight of the evidence 
is strong; or (2) when the defendant has been charged with a violent 
felony, there is probable cause that the defendant committed the 
 
99 MARIE VANNOSTRAND, NEW JERSEY JAIL POPULATION ANALYSIS: IDENTIFYING 
OPPORTUNITIES TO SAFELY AND RESPONSIBLY REDUCE THE JAIL POPULATION 11 (2013). 
100 Id. at 13. 
101 Id. 
102 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 135.255–135.265 (2015). 
103 Id. § 135.265. 
104 Id. § 135.240 (describing how defendants charged with offenses enumerated in 
Ballot Measure 11 of 1994 [establishing mandatory minimum sentences for certain crimes] 
are either ineligible for pretrial release or must post a bond of no less than $50,000 to 
secure release); see OR. REV. STAT. § 135.242 (2015) (describing Oregon’s separate statute 
for security release for certain methamphetamine offenses, which sets the security release 
amount at no less than $500,000). 
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crime, and there is clear and convincing evidence that release would 
pose a danger of physical injury to the victim or members of the 
public.105 
Oregon is one of four states in which commercial and surety bonds 
are prohibited,106 so defendants are required to post their own bail 
with cash, stocks, bonds, or with real property.107 The statute is silent 
on how judges should set the bail amount. Accordingly, certain 
counties have adopted security release schedules that link cash-bail 
amounts to the crimes being charged. These schedules vary from 
county to county. For example, a Class A misdemeanor that does not 
involve domestic violence or escape in Umatilla County requires 
$2500 bail for release.108 Meanwhile, in Lane County, this same 
Class A misdemeanor has a minimum bail set at $5000 but may be 
increased up to $15,000.109 Thus, bail requirement levels in Oregon 
seem to be capricious and self-defeating. While bail schedules are 
supposed to provide predictability and consistency, they provide quite 
the opposite in Oregon. The amount can vary greatly depending on 
which county one is arrested in. 
Multnomah County, Oregon, has embraced the ICCPR and the 
United States Constitution’s preference for release before 
adjudication and without cash bail. Of the 413 felony defendants 
released pretrial in that county in 2008, 290 were released on their 
own recognizance, 57 released on supervision, and 58 were released 
on cash-bail.110 Multnomah County also appears to recognize the 
importance of keeping defendants out of jail pretrial. On average, the 
Multnomah County jail holds ninety-eight defendants awaiting trial 
for more than 150 days, of which half those are awaiting trial on 
murder charges.111 These numbers suggest the County holds 
defendants in pretrial detention only when they commit dangerous 
 
105 OR. REV. STAT. § 135.240 (2015). 
106 Brian R. Johnson & Ruth S. Stevens, The Regulation and Control of Bail Recovery 
Agents: An Exploratory Study, 38(2) CRIM. JUST. REV. 190, 197 (2013). 
107 OR. REV. STAT. § 135.265 (2015). 
108 Order in the Matter of Adopting a Uniform Pre-trial Security Release Schedule for 
Umatilla and Morrow County Circuit Court Defendants, No. 11-001 (Or. Cir. Ct. 2011). 
109 Order in the Matter of the Adoption of the Uniform Security Release Schedule, No. 
619500007 (Or. Cir. Ct. 1998). 
110 ELIZABETH DAVIES & MATT O’KEEFE, PRETRIAL RELEASE AND MISCONDUCT OF 
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN MULTNOMAH COUNTY 3 (2010), https://multco.us/file/30549 
/download. 
111 MULTNOMAH COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, MONTHLY JAIL REPORT, JANUARY 2016 
17−18 (2016). 
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crimes, which is just what pretrial detention should be used for—not 
for holding non-dangerous criminals who cannot afford cash bail. 
III 
WHY DO STATES CONTINUE TO USE BAIL? 
A. Private Bail Bond Recovery 
One reason that states have not adopted the bail reforms detailed in 
the Federal Bail Reform Act is the power of the bail bondsmen lobby. 
Bail recovery agents, also known as bounty hunters, are private actors 
who detain and arrest defendants who have violated the condition of 
their pretrial release bonds.112 These agents are typically employed by 
private bail bondspersons, who post a surety bond on behalf of the 
accused, to be recovered only if the accused voluntarily appears for 
trial and complies with release conditions or if the bondsperson 
“recovers” an accused who has failed to appear or violated other 
conditions of release.113 States in which financial bail is the primary 
mechanism for ensuring compliance with release conditions provide a 
lucrative market for bail recovery agents.114 Because bail recovery 
agents are privately contracted, they are not bound by constitutional 
limitations on searches, seizures, interrogations, or the use of force 
that bind government actors in the United States.115 As a result, there 
have been instances in which bail recovery agents have injured, 
kidnapped, and killed innocent parties, subsequently enjoying 
immunity from subsequent civil suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.116 
While the bail recovery agent’s power to arrest and detain criminal 
defendants began in the English common law, states vary widely on 
how they govern bail recovery agents today.117 Four states have 
banned commercial bail bondsmen, twenty-eight states permit 
recovery by a licensed bail agent licensed under a state regulatory 
scheme, and eighteen states have no statutory or administrative 
provisions regulating bail recovery agents.118 In states falling under 
this last category, in theory, anyone could become a bail recovery 
agent regardless of education, training, certification, or criminal 
 
112 Johnson & Stevens, supra note 106, at 190. 
113 Id. at 191–92. 
114 Id. at 190–91. 
115 Id. at 192. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 193–94. 
118 Id. at 195. 
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history.119 This type of lawlessness is a side effect of the 
promulgation of the surety bond system that states use to assure a 
defendant’s appearance at court and should be replaced with more 
sensible pretrial detention programs. 
Because bail bondsmen represent such a large business interest in 
this country, they have secured a lobby to maintain their interests.120 
Pretrial service agencies directly conflict with the business interests of 
bondsmen: the more people released on non-financial conditions to 
the supervision of pretrial services agencies, the smaller the for-profit 
financial surety market.121 
Broward County, Florida, recently saw the power of the bail 
bondsmen lobby. Broward County’s pretrial services saved the county 
money, lowered jail crowding, and raised the rate of court 
appearances for defendants on pretrial release.122 County 
commissioners called the pretrial program a success, but two years 
after the commissioners voted to double the program’s funding, the 
very same commissioners passed an ordinance that strictly limited 
who can qualify for pretrial release.123 This was likely a result of the 
bondsmen hiring a lobbyist, who in turn gave almost $23,000 in 
campaign contributions to council members prior to the passage of the 
ordinance.124 
This type of pressure is widespread. Judge Ben C. Clyburn of 
Maryland has spoken out against the power of his state’s bail 
bondsmen’s lobby to stymie attempts to eliminate cash bail there.125 
To have a system in which we emphasize the use of pretrial services 
instead of financial incentives, the power of the bail bond industry 
must be counteracted. 
 
119 Id. at 199–200. 
120 Id. at 213. 
121 The same is true of states and counties which profit directly from the seizure of 
forfeited bail and the collection of non-refundable surety fees charged to defendants who 
are released on bail/bond posted directly with the state. 
122 Laura Sullivan, Bondsman Lobby Targets Pretrial Release Programs, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122725849. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Ian Duncan, Top District Court Judge Points to Power of Bail Bonds Lobby in 
Debate Over Reform, BALT. SUN (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news 
/maryland/crime/bal-top-district-court-judge-calls-out-bail-bonds-lobby-in-debate-over      
-reform-20140123-story.html. 
ROHRER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/24/2017  6:14 PM 
536 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95, 517 
B. Supervision Is Expensive 
The cost of implementing a pretrial services program is substantial, 
which may be why some counties and states are hesitant to 
implement, or continue to fund, pretrial services. Pretrial services are 
funded mainly by the local government.126 On their face, these 
programs can often appear to be quite the financial burden. For 
example, instituting a pretrial service program that conducts 
interviews and supervision with a staff size of eight people could cost 
between $200,000 to $500,000 per year.127 On paper, many 
municipalities and local governments would prefer to maintain the 
status quo. However, research has shown that incarcerating a 
defendant is eight times more costly than placing that defendant in the 
supervision of pretrial services.128 Hence, governments should 
consider implementing pretrial supervision programs in recognition of 
long-term financial cost savings in their jurisdictions. Part IV 
discusses just how much money can be saved through the 
implementation of electronic monitoring in contrast to pretrial 
detainment. 
C. Legislative Slowness and Complacency 
Legislatures are slow to develop laws regarding bail reform, and 
when a brave lawmaker does create a bill, it is often hard to curry 
support from fellow lawmakers. When the Honorable Jonathan 
Lippman, Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, proposed a 
bail-reform bill to the New York legislature, it failed to gain 
traction.129 One reason was and is the legislative complacency on 
criminal-justice system reforms. Specifically, lower crime statistics 
have taken the wind out of any momentum for reform.130 GOP 
candidates in the 2016 Presidential race employed  “tough on crime” 
 
126 PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION: A 
STARTER KIT 17 (2010). 
127 Id. at 18. 
128 U.S. COURTS, Supervision Costs Significantly Less Than Incarceration in Federal 
System, http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/07/18/supervision-costs-significantly-less-in 
carceration-federal-system (last visited on Mar. 12, 2017). 
129 James C. McKinley Jr., State’s Chief Judge, Citing ‘Injustice,’ Lays Out Plans to 
Alter Bail System, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/ny 
region/jonathan-lippman-bail-incarceration-new-york-state-chief-judge.html. 
130 Pat Garofalo, Soft on Crime, Part Two: The GOP’s Criminal Justice Scare Tactics 
Put Reform at Risk, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/the-report 
/articles/2015/09/18/has-2016-tough-on-crime-talk-already-doomed-criminal-justice          
-reform. 
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rhetoric to support stricter criminal justice policies and court voters 
away from “soft-on-crime liberals.”131 This strategy was persuasive, 
as former GOP Candidate and current President of the United States 
Donald Trump emphasized he was the “law-and-order candidate” in 
comparison to his Democratic Party rival Hillary Clinton.132 The 
combination of political rhetoric and lower crime rates has made bail-
reform legislation both unpopular to propose and difficult to pass. 
IV 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
A. Eliminate the Bail Schedule 
In Stack v. Boyle, the U.S. Supreme Court held that setting blanket 
bail for all codefendants was improper because the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure call for bail to be set based on individualized 
criteria.133 The Supreme Court emphasized this focus on the 
individual in Salerno, when it decided that judges must identify a 
specific future danger stemming from a defendant’s release pending 
trial as a prerequisite to ordering preventative detention.134 Despite 
this emphasis on the individual, many jurisdictions throughout the 
country rely on uniform bail schedules based solely on the offense(s) 
charged to provide guidance to judicial officials in determining a bail 
amount and to free up the court dockets more expeditiously.135 
However well intended these bail schedules were, they have serious 
negative consequents for arrestees. A study conducted in New York 
City revealed that, in 2008, of those arrested on non-felony charges 
who were given a bail of $1000 or less, only thirteen percent were 
able to post bail by the time of their arraignment.136 
Bail schedules effectively impose an arrest tax on those charged 
with low-risk offenses and result in de facto detention of those who 
cannot afford the amount set in the bail schedule.137 Though this does 
 
131 Id. 
132 Jon Schuppe, With Trump in White House, Criminal Justice Reformers Will Look 
Elsewhere, NBC News (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-election 
-day/trump-white-house-criminal-justice-reformers-will-look-elsewhere-n681536. 
133 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 9 (1951). 
134 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987). 
135 Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion?, 26 CRIM. 
JUST. 12, 13–14 (2011). 
136 Id. at 14. 
137 Id. 
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foster the detention of indigents, it also permits the release of 
potentially dangerous, wealthy defendants or career criminals who set 
aside money gained from their criminal activity to pay bail.138 The 
replacement of bail schedules with the exercise of judicial discretion 
and an emphasis on pretrial services would better ensure future court 
appearance and safety upon release. 
B. Switch to a Well-Resourced System of Pretrial Release and 
Supervision 
One impediment to a defendant’s fair shake during his or her 
detention hearing is the defendant’s lack of time and ability to provide 
information to prove he or she is a suitable candidate for release. The 
investigations conducted by pretrial service agencies can be costly 
and time consuming, and sometimes do not occur until after bail has 
been set.139 More resources should be directed toward these risk 
assessments so that judicial officers have more complete information 
to use in deciding whether to release defendants during detention 
hearings. 
C. Implementation of Technology to Reduce the Costs of Supervision 
The use of electronic monitoring of defendants would allow more 
defendants the freedom to maintain their employment, housing, and 
family ties and to assist their attorneys in crafting their defense, while 
still under supervision to ensure that they do not flee or pose a danger 
to the community.140 Although electronic monitoring technology has 
been available to law enforcement agencies since the 1980s, it has yet 
to supplant pretrial detention141 or the money bail system. 
Unfortunately, there are few studies on the effectiveness of pretrial 
electronic monitoring. Some European studies have reported that 
defendants released before trial with electronic monitoring appeared 
 
138 Id. at 17. 
139 LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MODEL FOR 
PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT 2 (2013), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/up 
loads/2014/02/LJAF-research-summary_PSA-Court_4_1.pdf. 
140 See Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 
YALE L.J. 1344, 1364 (2014) (stating that electronic monitoring will present a superior 
alternative to money bail for addressing flight risk). 
141 Id. 
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more often and reoffended less often than those without electronic 
monitoring.142 
While no form of electronic monitoring will be as effective in 
preventing flight as pretrial detention, due process dictates that the 
need to prevent flight should be balanced against the constraint of 
liberty imposed on the accused.143 In the context of defendants who 
are facing less serious charges, with the least incentive to flee if 
released, the balance tips in favor of release with monitoring.144 
Additionally, as technology becomes more effective, available, and 
inexpensive, the cost of detaining a defendant before trial will far 
outweigh the cost of placing on him a GPS monitor. Miami-Dade 
County, Florida, has already cut costs from $20,000 per pretrial 
defendant to $432 for each released, monitored defendant per 
annum.145 That cost savings should provide an incentive to local 
jurisdictions to move toward monitored pretrial release, particularly 
for defendants in pretrial detention solely because they could not post 
bail. 
A primary argument against electronic monitoring is the invasion 
of privacy.146 This is rightfully a concern, one to be weighed against 
the more severe privacy invasion of the primary alternative to 
electronic monitoring: pretrial detention in jail amongst fellow 
prisoners, guards, and security cameras.147 Granting credit for time-
served for the pretrial monitoring period could acknowledge the 
privacy invasion suffered by the monitored defendant and deter courts 
from using monitoring in place of less restrictive forms of release.148 
Overall, the use of GPS monitoring is preferable for those who lack 
the financial resources to post bail and should be implemented far 
more often to reduce pretrial detention. 
 
142 Id. at 1369–70 (discussing how between 1998 and 1999, 118 individuals had 
conditional release with GPS and had a failure to appear rate lower than national and local 
figures. Additionally, a small pilot program in 2002 in Portugal that imposed electronic 
monitoring showed no relevant noncompliances nor revoked orders for the thirty-nine total 
participants.). 
143 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). 
144 Id. at 1371. 
145 Id. at 1372. 
146 Eric Maes & Benjamin Mine, Some Reflections on the Possible Introduction of 
Electronic Monitoring as an Alternative to Pre-trial Detention in Belgium, 52 HOW. J. 
CRIM. JUST. 144, 150–57 (2013). 
147 Wiseman, supra note 140, at 1375. 
148 Id. at 1379. 
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D. Recalibrating Risk Assessment 
Of course, predicting the future is not an easy task, especially when 
lives are at risk. But with more and more research published on the 
subject of recidivism, pretrial services agencies and judges can more 
accurately predict whether a defendant truly poses a danger. One 
study has shown that factors like whether the victim suffered an 
injury, whether the crime involved a weapon, whether the defendant 
consumes alcohol, and the defendant’s residential history have little to 
no correlation with whether the defendant will fail to appear in court 
or commit a crime while awaiting trial.149 However, this study was 
unable to arrive at reliable factors that can predict whether a 
defendant will appear at trial or not.150 More research is needed to 
validate scientifically the relationship between the factors listed in the 
Bail Reform Act and those used by pretrial service agencies in 
predicting the risk that defendants pose by a given release. 
CONCLUSION 
The move away from cash-bail to the more humanitarian view 
advanced by the Bail Reform Act and the ICCPR is a difficult change 
to implement. If a judicial officer releases a defendant before trial, 
and the defendant does not show up for trial, or worse, commits an 
additional crime while out on pretrial release, society is likely to 
blame the judge. It takes courage to accept the inherent inaccuracies 
of risk assessment and advance good faith attempts to individualize 
pretrial release decisions. 
When will our jails be so overcrowded that they incite action and 
change how we treat those awaiting trial? At what point will we allow 
those like the late seventeen-year-old Kalief the opportunity to await 
his trial on his own recognizance, rather than in the harsh 
environment found within our jails? 
As a society, we need to do more to protect those like Kalief from 
the treacheries of unnecessary pretrial detention. We need to 
challenge bail bondsmen lobbyists who oppose the creation of full 
funding of pretrial service agencies, eliminate bail schedules linking 
pretrial release to the crime charged and the financial resources of the 
accused, and resist the political fear mongering rhetoric that holds 
 
149 KRISTIN BECHTEL ET AL., IDENTIFYING THE PREDICTORS OF PRETRIAL FAILURE: A 
META-ANALYSIS 13 (2011). 
150 Id. 
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back bail reform. Pretrial services have been proven to be effective. 
Now we just need the laws to implement them universally. 
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